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AN AEROSPACE POWER ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY  
FOR IRAQ AND THE PERSIAN GULF AFTER SANCTIONS

by

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## ***Preface***

*It appears unlikely that Iraq will actually attack Kuwait. Rather, it appears that they will settle for both monetary and territorial concessions.*

—1 Lt Robert Blanke, 1 Aug 1990, in briefing to TAC/AIN

That statement undoubtedly encapsulates the biggest mistake of my career—believing that Saddam Hussein would not invade Kuwait in 1990. While I was not alone in that belief, having to brief the TAC/AIN again on the morning of 2 Aug gave me a chance to “clarify” the territorial concessions sought by the Iraqis in Kuwait. This one moment set the course for the rest of my career. We have now come ten years since that time, and must look to the future. Hopefully, others will not repeat my mistakes.

First of all, I would like to thank my faculty advisor, Dr. Bill Dean. His confidence in the end result of this project is highly encouraging. Additionally, his adherence to a stricter standard of performance has helped focus this work. But ultimately, thanks goes to the other members of the CHECKMATE team, who started working this sort of project with me back in the early Summer of 1998. Chris “Mort” Bowman, Merrick Krause, Dave “Tooms” Toomey, Tony Eret, Todd Westhauser, and Rick “Murph” Murphy were all around at the figurative birth of this effort. This work hopefully represents the culmination of what we started back in the summer of ’98. This time, maybe we’ll get our point across.



### *Abstract*

At some point in the future, sanctions against Iraq will not be in place, whether they are formally lifted or fail and become unenforceable. At that point, Saddam Hussein will be able to rebuild his military establishment. The re-establishment of Iraq's conventional forces will provide a shield for the regime, which they can use to protect the development of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. The US allies in the region, the Gulf Cooperation Council states, are unable to come to political agreement on whether Iraq or Iran is the primary threat to them, and do not have the military strength required to address either threat without outside support. Finally, US vital interests in the region will not change with the ending of sanctions. Accordingly, a new military approach should be developed—one that elevates land-based aerospace power into the main effort of a joint strategy. This strategy will have the objectives of enhancing regional partnerships, maintaining the counterproliferation regime against Iraq, maintaining the capability to deter and take punitive action when needed, and engaging and defeating Iraqi military forces if deterrence fails. The inherent flexibility, lethality, speed, and range of aerospace power make it the most logical choice as the main effort in a region that emphasizes the advantages of aerospace power to a great degree.

## **Chapter 1**

### **Introduction**

Sanctions have been in place on Saddam Hussein's Iraq since shortly after the invasion of Kuwait. Nothing lasts forever, though—Saddam has been able to exploit a variety of factors to weaken the sanctions regime. Locally, there is Arab concern and unrest over lack of progress in the Middle East Peace Process, and differences in threat perception between the US/UK and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Coalition partners. The GCC and selected members of the UN Security Council (UNSC) Permanent Five are also suffering from “sanctions fatigue.” Accordingly, this paper is written under the assumption that sanctions are gone, whether formally lifted or having failed in some other way. When sanctions are gone, what is the role of American aerospace power in the Persian Gulf region, and how is it best employed?

An aerospace power strategy must be built on the foundation of the regional conditions and the US interests and objectives that it would serve. First of all, even though sanctions may be gone, certain restrictions on Iraqi military activities will remain in place. Iraq will remain the greatest security concern in a post-sanctions environment. The capabilities they could rebuild with the lifting of sanctions represent a grave threat to the region. The other component of the regional equation is the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Who do they perceive as a regional threat, and what military capabilities do they have against that threat? The other element shaping a

future aerospace power strategy is US interests in the region. Maintaining stability and the free flow of oil through the Gulf are vital interests of the United States. With the end of sanctions, US emphasis will shift to the GCC Coalition partners. What would US objectives for a future strategy in the region be? If these problems are addressed using military means, what balance of military tools is best suited to addressing these challenges?

How, then, does the United States meet all of these differing objectives with an integrated aerospace power strategy? The first element of it must be focused on engagement. The partnership with the GCC air forces should be developed, with an eye toward improving their capabilities against any threat, as well as their capability to receive US forces and integrate seamlessly with US forces in Coalition actions. The second aspect of the strategy is oriented on Iraq, aiming to aid continuing counterproliferation efforts and deterring Iraqi aggression. Finally, the strategy must take into account what happens if deterrence fails. The efforts to enhance ties with the GCC will bear fruit here as well, providing regional support for US actions as well as providing a more capable force acting in concert with our own. In short, aerospace power, primarily provided by the US Air Force, is the tool of choice for the future in the Persian Gulf. However, one must plan for employing it, with proper national support in the form of congruent political and military objectives, and requirements factored into existing planning and deployment structures. Proper development of regional ties along with them will ensure both access to and the support of regional partners.

## Chapter 2

### Iraq After the End of Sanctions

Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq was the most powerful Arab state in the region. After the failure of the sanctions regime, Iraq will be able to reconstruct its conventional military strength, and also devote greater emphasis to WMD capabilities. As Hussein rebuilds his military establishment, the capabilities he develops will determine the threat he poses to regional stability. The continued development of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile delivery systems will give him a strategic deterrent, and the reconstruction of large armored forces will provide him with a power projection capability against his neighbors. However, the absence of sanctions does not mean an end to restrictions. Certain limits will remain in place, even after sanctions fail.



Figure 1 Map of Iraq

## **Continuing UN Restrictions on Iraq**

Two UNSC Resolutions passed after the Gulf War will remain in effect following the end of sanctions. UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 687, passed on 3 April 1991, was the primary resolution establishing the conditions the Iraqis had to abide by in order to obtain the lifting of sanctions. It also established restrictions on the development of weapons of mass destruction detailed in the section on Iraq, and these restrictions are permanent—Iraq is prohibited from developing weapons of mass destruction in perpetuity. It also provides for permanent monitoring of these facilities following Iraqi compliance with the abolition of their WMD stocks. Finally, it includes a Chapter VII authorization under the UN charter.<sup>1</sup> This could allow for the use of force in the event of violations of the resolution.

UNSCR 949, passed on 15 October 1994, once again references Chapter VII of the UN Charter, as well as UNSCR 687. It provides two restrictions on Iraq that should significantly impact its capability to threaten Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. The first of these is a restriction against enhancing military capability in Southern Iraq. Iraq will have to deploy forces to the southern areas near Basrah prior to taking any action against Kuwait. This will make it easier to detect preparations for offensive operations on their part. The second directs Iraq to refrain from threatening its neighbors militarily.<sup>2</sup> Accordingly, the UN has provided a baseline for debate, and agreed-upon restrictions against deployments *en masse* into southern Iraq, should Iraq begin deploying forces into the South.

It is important to note that the restrictions on Iraq will not serve as a deterrent to Saddam Hussein, in the areas of WMD development or aggressive actions against his neighbors. Iraq has continued to preserve their WMD programs, in spite of them having been banned for ten years. The UNSC resolutions do allow for action against Iraq, though. The fact that both of them have

Chapter VII authorization means that military action is authorized in response to violations of these resolutions. UN approval for military actions in response to violations of either resolution is not needed. The Security Council has already provided a mandate for action in the resolution itself, should Iraq violate the restrictions on WMD development and production. With that authority, the US and the GCC have a diplomatic pretext for direct action against Iraq, without having to re-address the issue diplomatically in the Security Council.

### **Iraqi Conventional Forces**



**Figure 2 Iraqi self-propelled artillery captured during DESERT STORM**

### **Iraqi Ground Forces—the Primary Offensive Arm**

There are two distinct ground forces in the Iraqi inventory, the Republican Guards and the regular Iraqi Army. The Republican Guards are the primary offensive arm of the Hussein Regime. Additionally, they ensure the security for the regime, and enjoy special pay and privileges relative to the remainder of the ground forces. There are currently six divisions of Republican Guards forces, organized in two corps formations. They provide the defensive ring around Baghdad, providing security for the regime itself. Additionally, they were used in

offensive operations against the Kurds in 1996, with four out of six divisions recognized for service in that campaign. They have the most modern equipment available, and unlike the regular forces, they have largely kept their equipment operational.<sup>3</sup> Strategic mobility is a critical weakness of the Republican Guards at the moment, though. When the Iraqis attempted to move forces out into Western Iraq in the fall of 2000, they encountered many problems, related to shortages of both parts and transport capability.<sup>4</sup> Addressing these issues will be a priority for the Hussein regime in the post-sanctions era. The regular Iraqi Army is organized in five corps formations, with 17 total divisions. These divisions are arrayed primarily along the Iranian border, the North against the Kurds, and in the South against both the Shi'ites and the Kurds, and are usually tailored to their specific mission and area of responsibility. While the Army is primarily a defensive force, it proved capable of taking successful offensive action in the late stages of the Iran-Iraq War.<sup>5</sup> These forces, in combination, are the major source of military power for the Hussein regime.

With the end of sanctions, there will be considerable investment in the Iraqi ground forces, especially the Republican Guards. Before an effective offensive force is fielded, many problems will have to be addressed. Existing units will have to be re-equipped, and the transport capability needed to move heavy forces would have to be rebuilt. Once the Republican Guards are re-established as the premier offensive force, the Regular Army will be rebuilt. However, it will likely continue in the internal security and defensive roles it has occupied since the Gulf War. When the Republican Guards are rebuilt, the Iraqis will once again have a force that can overwhelm any resistance offered by Kuwait or the GCC as a whole. That will serve as the primary threat in the region.

## **The Iraqi Air and Air Defense Forces—A Shield Against Coalition Actions?**

During DESERT STORM, the Iraqi Air Force was decimated. The aircraft that served in their front lines during the war—the MiG-29/FULCRUM, Mirage F-1EQ, and MiG-25/FOXBAT, are still their frontline weapons, but now suffer from a shortage of parts caused by sanctions.<sup>6</sup> Their training areas have been progressively restricted since the end of the Gulf War.

Iraqi air force activity has been largely limited to training, with some sporadic attempts at interfering with Coalition aircraft patrolling the No-Fly Zones.<sup>7</sup> Modernization of the air force will be difficult after sanctions—there are many needs to address, starting with re-establishing a supply of spare parts for existing aircraft, and allowing pilots to begin training again.<sup>8</sup> France and Russia will be more than willing to make up Iraq's losses once sanctions are lifted, but high technology alone is not enough. They must address training deficiencies, as they have never been organized to fight as a modern, integrated air force. This would involve a reorganization of the command structure, and improvements in every aspect of their training.<sup>9</sup> Many of these same problems are also present in their air defense structure.



**Figure 3 Iraqi SA-8/GECKO surface-to-air missile system**



Iraq's air defense forces were also soundly defeated in DESERT STORM, although they have been unsuccessfully engaging aircraft enforcing the No-Fly Zones.<sup>10</sup> Coalition military operations against these air defenses have taken place as recently as February of this year. The air defense system is capable of tracking and engaging targets throughout most of Iraq, and the Iraqis have repaired much of the damage done during the Gulf War.<sup>11</sup> Modernization of the air defenses remains a priority for the Hussein regime—including improvements to both the detection and tracking networks, as well as the anti-aircraft missiles and artillery systems. Advanced surface-to-air missile systems like the Russian S-300 are needed to upgrade their engagement capabilities. These systems must be integrated into the overall air defense system, and the command and control systems to support them must be obtained.<sup>12</sup> The recent furor over possible Chinese upgrades to the Iraqi telecommunications network illustrates the need to upgrade more than just the weapons. If the system as a whole is upgraded, the Iraqis could create an air defense system that could detect, track, and engage a variety of targets. This would give the Hussein regime greater freedom from the threat of Coalition air attack. This would make restarting the WMD and ballistic missile development programs that much easier.

### **Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs**

The reconstruction of conventional forces will provide a shield for other Iraqi efforts after the end of sanctions. A main effort will be devoted to the reconstruction of an arsenal of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile delivery systems. While sanctions were in place, the major emphasis of the Hussein regime's struggle against sanctions was to preserve some vestige of their capabilities in the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile arenas. In this they have succeeded, although they do not have the capability

that existed prior to DESERT STORM. Upon the end of sanctions, this process will be able to proceed in a relatively unfettered manner.



**Figure 4 SS-1b/SCUD on Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL)**

The Iraqi chemical weapons program was the most developed of the three during DESERT STORM, and continues to pose a great threat today. The Iraqis were able to deliver a variety of agents, including nerve agents. Additionally, they had adapted their agents to a variety of delivery methods, from airborne and artillery through ballistic missile delivery. They retain a significant chemical weapons capability, and the demise of sanctions will enable it to threaten population centers and area targets with air-delivered chemical weapons from stocks they have hidden.<sup>13</sup> The nuclear program is the hardest to hide, and the Iraqi nuclear infrastructure has been partially dismantled as a consequence of inspections. However, Iraq still has the expertise and the design information needed to restart the program,<sup>14</sup> and Saddam Hussein still sees nuclear weapons as vital to his regime.<sup>15</sup> The biological weapons program is the easiest to disguise—any pharmaceutical firm or university research facility could serve as a development center. They experimented with a wide variety of agents, and fielded quantities of Anthrax and Botulinum toxin. The impact of this threat cannot be ignored. While Iraqi delivery methods are

still crude, even an attempted strike using biological weapons could have political results out of proportion with the actual military impact of the strike.<sup>16</sup>

Under UNSCR 687, the Iraqis are prohibited from developing or producing surface-to-surface missiles with a range exceeding 150 kilometers.<sup>17</sup> This effectively limits them to the legal development of missiles for battlefield use. However, it appears that the Iraqis are continuing work on longer-range missiles under the cover of legitimate missile research. Existing Iraqi missiles have the capability to threaten all of Syria, Israel, Lebanon, Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Qatar—as well as most major Iranian cities (see figure 5).<sup>18</sup> They had extended the range of their missiles, albeit at the expense of accuracy—already a problem with the SS-1/SCUD.<sup>19</sup> The Iraqis have continued development of long-range rocket motors, and have attempted the import of Russian guidance systems. These activities, along with many others, were uncovered as the emphasis on missiles was renewed following the defections of Hussein and Saddam Kamil al-Majid in 1995.<sup>20</sup>



**Figure 5 Map Showing Iraqi Ballistic Missile Ranges**

In a post-sanctions environment, WMD and ballistic missile programs may well become a centerpiece for the Iraqi regime. First of all, possessing WMD and ballistic missiles confers an unquestioned status upon those who possess them. In a post-sanctions era, efforts to develop and field these weapons will increase, in spite of continuing restrictions.<sup>21</sup> The Hussein regime derives a variety of benefits from these programs. First of all, they serve as a strategic deterrent to possible opponents, including nations like Iran, Israel, and possibly Syria.<sup>22</sup> Secondly, they serve to intimidate the GCC states, forcing them to acknowledge Iraq's power in the region. Finally, there is the possibility that WMD could be used to deny access to US forces entering the region in response to Iraqi actions. The demonstrated willingness to use these weapons both against the Iranians and the Iraqi people, make them a dangerous part of Iraq's arsenal.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 687, 3 April 1991, available online at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1991>.

<sup>2</sup> United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 949, 15 October 1994, available online at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1994/9440171e.htm>.

<sup>3</sup> Anthony Cordesman, Iraq and the War of Sanctions: Conventional threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction, Praeger: Westport, CT, 1999, p. 77-80.

<sup>4</sup> Director of Central Intelligence, Statement to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 7 February 2001, available online at [http://www.odci.gov/cia/public\\_affairs/speeches/UNCLASWWT\\_02072001.html](http://www.odci.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/UNCLASWWT_02072001.html).

<sup>5</sup> Cordesman, Iraq and the War of Sanctions, p. 74-78.

<sup>6</sup> Iraqi Air Force Report, USNI Military Database, available online at [www.periscope.ucg.com/docs/nations/mideast/iraq/airforce/index.html](http://www.periscope.ucg.com/docs/nations/mideast/iraq/airforce/index.html).

<sup>7</sup> Cordesman, Iraq and the War of Sanctions, pp. 134-139.

<sup>8</sup> Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—Iraq, Air Force, Iraq, available online at [www.janesonline.com](http://www.janesonline.com).

<sup>9</sup> Cordesman, Iraq and the War of Sanctions, pp. 118-133.

<sup>10</sup> Iraqi Military Organization Report, USNI Military Database, available online at [www.periscope.ucg.com/docs/nations/mideast/iraq/organzn/index.html](http://www.periscope.ucg.com/docs/nations/mideast/iraq/organzn/index.html).

<sup>11</sup> Cordesman, Iraq and the War of Sanctions, pp. 134-139.

<sup>12</sup> Cordesman, Iraq and the War of Sanctions, pp. 139-140.

<sup>13</sup> Cordesman, Iraq and the War of Sanctions, pp. 542-563.

<sup>14</sup> Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, pp. 39-40, available online at <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf>.

<sup>15</sup> Institute for National and Strategic Studies, Strategic Assessment 1999: Priorities for a Turbulent World, p. 114, available online at <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/sa99/sa99cont.html>.

<sup>16</sup> Cordesman, Iraq and the War of Sanctions, pp. 574-599.

<sup>17</sup> United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 687, 3 April 1991, available online at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1991>.

<sup>18</sup> Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, p. 41.

<sup>19</sup> Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, pp. 39-41.

<sup>20</sup> Cordesman, Iraq and the War of Sanctions, pp. 488-492.

<sup>21</sup> Institute for National and Strategic Studies, Strategic Assessment 1999, p. 221.

<sup>22</sup> Institute for National and Strategic Studies, Strategic Assessment 1999, p. 117.

## **Chapter 3**

### **The GCC—Perceptions and Capabilities**

Any attempt to craft a strategy for the post-sanctions environment must take into account the other regional actors. The only collective security organization that currently exists in the region is the GCC. This was primarily formed in response to the recognition that either Iran or Iraq was a match for all six of these countries acting in unison. As such, they are natural partners for the US in the Persian Gulf. However, there are two major issues that have to be addressed. First of all, the US must take into account the differences in threat perceptions between the US and the GCC, and between individual members of the GCC. Secondly, the military problem faced by the GCC is difficult, and US security thinking in the region has to take it into account.

#### **Threat Perceptions**

All six of the GCC members are political and military allies of the United States at this time, and this is vital to our interests in the region. However, only one of the six is firmly focused on Iraq as the primary threat to them—Kuwait. Furthermore, even the Kuwaitis are willing to consider lifting sanctions against Iraq.<sup>1</sup> Of the other five, only Saudi Arabia considers Iraq to be a threat at all.<sup>2</sup> There is a simple explanation for this—geography. Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman feel a greater threat from Iran than Iraq, and have in fact extended diplomatic recognition to Iraq once again.<sup>3</sup> Additionally, Oman has also renewed contacts with Iran, and their efforts, along with Saudi Arabia's, have gone farther toward reducing tensions in the region than any US

efforts directed at Iran.<sup>4</sup> Finally, the breakdown of the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process will continue to impact the region. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a major security concern for Saudi Arabia.<sup>5</sup> Additionally, there were demonstrations in favor of the Palestinian uprising in both Saudi Arabia and Oman.<sup>6</sup> In the post-sanctions environment, all of these trends will continue, and we will have to factor in the differing focuses.

As the largest member of the GCC, Saudi Arabia has the biggest impact on GCC policy. While they perceive Iran to be a greater threat to them than Iraq, they have taken steps to address that problem. Following the election of Mohammed Khatami to the Iranian presidency, they reached out and renewed contacts with the Islamic Republic. They have recently demonstrated a preference for bilateral negotiations, as opposed to working through the GCC structure. The Saudis are concerned about Iraqi adventurism, though. They are aware that the Hussein regime holds them responsible for their defeat in 1991.<sup>7</sup> They see the problem with sanctions as one largely caused by the Iraqis. However, they are concerned by what they perceive as inconsistencies in US policy, and as a result are hesitant to support military action against Iraq.<sup>8</sup> In short, while all of these states align themselves with us, they each have a unique view of the region. This complicates the effort to contain Saddam Hussein in a post-sanctions environment: Not all see him as the greatest threat, and there is no agreement between members on how to deal with the problems they do have.

### **Military Capabilities**

None of these countries can adequately address any of the threats they foresee. Kuwait has the most capable forces, but they are small and undermanned in critical areas. The Saudis have the largest military establishment—but they are also suffering from manning and budgetary problems, and are inadequate to meet either Iran or Iraq without US support. The UAE suffers

the worst from the “showroom procurement”—the buying of weapons for the appearance of strength, as opposed to training on and using them. Oman’s situation is much like Kuwait’s—they are capable but very small. The GCC has had no influence in bringing these disparate forces together. They have not exercised together and cannot quickly support one another in times of crisis.<sup>9</sup>

**Table 1 Correlation of Ground Forces—Equipment**

	Iraq	Iran	Saudi Arabia	Kuwait	Bahrain	Qatar	Oman	UAE
Tanks	2200	1450	1050	350	110	30	122	225
APCs/IFVs	3500	1300	2740	235	260	236		845
Other Armor			300		46		129	146
Artillery Pieces	1900	4200	656	82	49	40	108	

SOURCE: USCENTCOM

An examination of the correlation of forces completes the analysis. The table above shows that the correlation on the ground is adverse, to say the least. Of all of the GCC states, only Saudi Arabia has the land forces required to engage either Iraq or Iran. But the Saudis cannot raise the manpower required to man their land forces.<sup>10</sup>

**Table 2 Correlation of Regional Air Forces**

	Iraq	Iran	Saudi Arabia	Kuwait	Bahrain	Qatar	Oman	UAE
Fighters & Ftr-Bmbrs	255	310	348	70	24	21	46	97
Transport, Tanker & ISR		160	85					
Helicopters		585	54	16	14	20	41	42
Trainers	80	130	176					

SOURCE: USCENTCOM

The air picture is a different story. The GCC states have capitalized on their stronger economies and built technologically superior air forces. They have a significant precision strike capability, primarily with Kuwaiti F/A-18s, Saudi F-15Ss, and Saudi Tornado IDS aircraft. Additionally,



the Saudis have some air refueling capability, as well as the only E-3 AWACS aircraft exported outside of NATO.<sup>11</sup> But this does not make up for the problems detailed above. While technologically capable, the GCC forces are simply not capable of addressing the threats they face. Iraq has never renounced its claim to Kuwait, and is deeply vengeful over both the war and the redrawing of the borders.<sup>12</sup> A revanchist Iraq would have little difficulty annexing Kuwait in short order in the post-sanctions environment. Accordingly, the GCC must be prepared to address a reinvigorated Iraqi military threat.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> Diana Elias, "Kuwait Details Position on Iraq," The Washington Post, 18 March 2001, available online at <http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/world/specials/mideast/iraq/A22301-2001Mar18.html>.

<sup>2</sup> Anthony Cordesman, The Gulf in Transition: US Policy Ten Years After the Gulf War, pp. 49-124, available online at <http://www.csis.org/gulf/reports/mainfullreport.PDF>.

<sup>3</sup> Ghanim Alnajjar, "The GCC and Iraq," Middle East Policy, Vol VII, No. 4, October 2000, p. 93.

<sup>4</sup> Cordesman, The Gulf in Transition, pp. 49-124.

<sup>5</sup> Joseph Kechichian, "Trends in Saudi National Security," The Middle East Journal, Spring 1999, Vol. 53, Number 2, p. 247.

<sup>6</sup> Director of Central Intelligence, Statement to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

<sup>7</sup> Kechichian, pp. 237-242.

<sup>8</sup> Alnajjar, pp. 97-98.

<sup>9</sup> Cordesman, The Gulf in Transition, pp. 49-124.

<sup>10</sup> Kechichian, p. 247-251.

<sup>11</sup> Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—The Gulf States, Armed Forces, Saudi Arabia, available online at [www.janesonline.com](http://www.janesonline.com).

<sup>12</sup> Cordesman, The Gulf in Transition, pp. 81-91.

## **Chapter 4**

### **US Interests, Objectives, and the Instrument of Choice**

While US interests in much of the world have changed over the past decade, it is interesting to note that the primary US interest in the Persian Gulf region has remained focused on ensuring stability and access to the region's resources. These interests dictate both focus and objectives in this arena for the United States. And this focus on vital interests and the resulting objectives must be maintained. If the US is distracted by the actions of the Hussein regime, the strategic initiative is ceded to the Iraqis. As such, a comprehensive strategy must be developed, based on vital interests and allowing the US to maintain the initiative over regional adversaries.

#### **US Interests in the Persian Gulf**

Of all of the places where military force has been used in the last ten years, the Persian Gulf region is the only place where our vital interests have been directly impacted. Additionally, it has an impact on our interests outside of the vital range, cutting through all of the important boundaries as defined in the last National Security Strategy of the Clinton administration. While many changes are likely as the new Bush administration formulates its national security principles and strategy, the vital interests of the US in the Persian Gulf are unlikely to change. The primary focus of national strategy should shift from containing Iraq to the maintenance of ties with the GCC, both to bolster the GCC against Iraq and to ensure continued US access to the region.

The vital interests of the United States in the region are fairly simple. The free flow of oil through the Persian Gulf must be maintained, regional stability ensured, both Iraq and Iran contained to promote that stability, and promote economic development in the region.<sup>1</sup> These interests form the baseline for the development of US military objectives in the region, addressing both better relationships with allies and the containment of adversaries. However, military objectives must take regional conditions and threats into account, allowing for a comprehensive strategy for regional engagement.

### **US Military Objectives in a Post-Sanctions Environment**

United States Central Command (CENTCOM), responsible for military actions in the region, and has established a regional strategy that provides the structure for military operations in the region. It is organized into a variety of objectives, grouped under development, engagement, and warfighting headings.<sup>2</sup> Additionally, CENTCOM has sub-regional strategies which will provide some focus on the specific area in question—in this case, Iraq and the Arabian Gulf. Since aerospace operations in the region are conducted under their aegis, it is logical that this structure should provide the overarching military objectives required of a post-sanctions regional strategy. There are two components that dictate the focus and priority of any effort. The key element will be the deterrence of Iraqi aggression, as well as preventing Iraq from acquiring a WMD capability. But CENTCOM's regional focus is on achieving greater interoperability and military cooperation within the region, as well as enhancing the infrastructure required to conduct operations.<sup>3</sup> In short, while the major threat is Iraq, the focus should be on the GCC.

This establishes clear priorities for the military objectives. The primary military objective is “protect, promote and preserve U.S. interests in the Central Region to include the free flow of

energy resources, access to regional states, freedom of navigation, and maintenance of regional stability.” Accomplishing objectives under the engagement banner will come first in framing priorities for an aerospace strategy, followed closely by the warfighting objectives. The engagement objectives include the development of coalition structures, the development of effective regional militaries, the promotion of counterproliferation efforts, and the maintenance of ties with regional military leaders. Warfighting objectives include maintaining the infrastructure needed to fight, developing deterrent capability, and maintaining readiness to fight.<sup>4</sup> In short, the primary focus of efforts should be on the GCC, then on the deterrence of Iraq and counterproliferation measures, and finally on being prepared to confront and defeat Iraqi aggression against our regional partners and interests. These objectives will continue to be valid in a post-sanctions environment. But what military tools are best for addressing these objectives?

### **The Best Fit for the Region—Land-Based Aerospace Power**

In DESERT STORM, all of the services were needed to defeat Iraq in a joint effort. However, land-based aerospace power played a predominant role, and will continue to do so in the future. There are a number of reasons for this. First of all, the geography of the region makes it the ideal place to employ it. The deserts of southern Iraq and Kuwait were the ideal place to employ airpower against ground forces, owing primarily to the relatively open terrain, especially when contrasted with the Balkans or Korea. On the other side, the great ranges in the region factor into it. Ranges are immense—for example, F-16s based at Al Dhafra in the UAE during DESERT STORM were required to fly over 500 nautical miles just to get to the Iraqi border.<sup>5</sup> This necessitates air-to-air refueling for longer-term operations. Secondly, there is a well-developed infrastructure for receiving land-based aerospace power in the region. During

the Gulf War, USCENTAF staged aircraft out of 18 airfields, basing in five GCC countries.<sup>6</sup> The Saudis had spent \$600 billion to develop the military infrastructure that was first tested in DESERT STORM.<sup>7</sup> In short, the theater itself, by virtue of the terrain and range, lends itself to land-based aerospace power. Finally, the facilities needed to receive an influx of aircraft are already in place, significant sums having been spent on developing the necessary infrastructure.

The money spent on aviation infrastructure points to the third reason for choosing an aerospace power solution—the GCC has adopted it for their own purposes. As discussed previously, the GCC does not have the military organization or the manpower required for defeating Iraq in open land combat. They have leveraged their superior economic power to provide for relatively strong air forces, hoping that technology can become an asymmetric factor in addressing the threats they face. This does not mean they have addressed all of the problems they face, as they still suffer from manning shortages and “showroom procurement” practices.<sup>8</sup> It is here that aerospace power can serve best in an engagement role.



**Figure 6 1<sup>st</sup> TFW F-15C deployed to Dhahran AB during DESERT STORM**

Finally, the relative speed of deployment for aerospace power provides a great advantage. During Operation DESERT SHIELD, the majority of US Air Force combat power required for

offensive operations was in place by 1 Oct 90, less than sixty days after deployments began. There were a few exceptions, but the reasons for their delay had more to do with factors outside of deployability, to include availability of assets just coming into the inventory (F-15Es, LANTIRN-capable F-16s), and increased requirements dictated by an increased force presence as time went on.<sup>9</sup> In contrast, the Army at this time did not have the force required to go onto the offensive, and would not have that force until well into December. In an environment conducive to its employment, the deployment speed of aerospace assets makes them that much more suitable to regional strategy.

When all of these factors are considered, the aerospace power solution recommends itself for this part of the world. The theater in question is uniquely suited to it, the facilities for receiving it are available, it best complements the capabilities of our allies, and it provides the greatest combat power in the least amount of time. The question that remains is how to best employ aerospace power throughout the spectrum of conflict presented in the Persian Gulf region. It is not an independent force, however. Aerospace forces cannot hold land or board surface ships. Ground and naval forces will be vital in accomplishing many of the tasks required in the region. However, land-based aerospace forces will form the primary effort and perform most of the required tasks.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> A National Security Strategy for a New Century, The White House, December 1999, pp. 42-45.

<sup>2</sup> US Central Command Regional Strategy, Available online at [http://www.centcom.mil/theater\\_strat/theater\\_strat.htm](http://www.centcom.mil/theater_strat/theater_strat.htm).

<sup>3</sup> US Central Command Sub-Regional Strategy: Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula, Available online at [http://www.centcom.mil/subregional\\_strat/arab\\_region.htm](http://www.centcom.mil/subregional_strat/arab_region.htm).

<sup>4</sup> US Central Command Regional Strategy.

<sup>5</sup> Williamson Murray with Wayne W. Thompson, Air War in the Persian Gulf, Baltimore: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1996, p. 88.

<sup>6</sup> Murray, p. 88.

## Notes

<sup>7</sup> Kechichian, “p. 249.

<sup>8</sup> Recapitulation of points from Cordesman, The Gulf in Transition, and Kechichian.

<sup>9</sup> Murray, pp. 323-325.

## **Chapter 5**

### **Aerospace Power in the Post-Sanctions Environment**

While aerospace power can provide a good solution for the Persian Gulf, it must be employed properly if the strategy is to succeed. Using the existing USCENTCOM regional engagement objectives as a foundation, a five-part aerospace power strategy can be developed. The strategy starts by addressing the highest priority—aiding the GCC in developing more effective and better-integrated air forces. Since counterproliferation activities will still be a concern, the second part of the strategy addresses that issue. Then, the flexible deterrent options that will serve as a foundation for both punitive strike and warfighting force deployments are addressed, along with the measures required to conduct lower-order strikes. Finally, the ability to counter Iraqi aggression against the GCC should be built into a sound regional aerospace strategy. This should emphasize the advantages of aerospace power, making it the primary effort of the joint campaign. However, ground forces cannot be ignored, as they play an important role in supporting the air scheme of maneuver.

#### **Aerospace Power Engagement Activities**

Peacetime engagement clearly falls under the MOOTW rubric. These activities are a key part of the Air Force contribution in this arena. Both Joint Pub (JP) 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War and Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-3, MOOTW, clearly identify security assistance to US allies as a mission for US armed forces. Military



training operations, as well as arms supplies and shipments fall in this area.<sup>1</sup> This clearly supports the engagement objectives detailed previously, both by providing assistance to GCC forces and maintaining contact with them. It also capitalizes on one of the few military strengths the GCC has—the availability of capable air platforms. However, it must address the weaknesses the GCC suffers to the greatest extent possible. There are varieties of activities that would be of benefit to the GCC air forces, and by extension our own security posture in the region. Any approach to this must be two-tiered, however. First of all, basic deficiencies in tactical performance must be corrected, allowing the GCC forces to move from a “showroom” force that is capable on paper to one that is capable in the air. The second challenge will be focusing on command and control procedures, allowing the smooth integration of GCC and US forces into a single air operation as required.

Correcting the tactical deficiencies of the GCC air forces is a relatively simple matter on paper. CENTCOM has already begun emphasizing operational and logistical performance of existing forces in its own theater engagement policies. Additionally, the GCC states have long been represented in US training programs, including everything from basic flight training to advanced professional military education..<sup>2</sup> In order to transition from a paper force to a deadly force, GCC pilots will have to be trained to fully employ the systems they have. This is critical when you consider the technological superiority that platforms like the F-15S and F/A-18 enjoy over the MiG-29s employed by both Iran and Iraq. There are a variety of ways to accomplish these objectives. Existing permanent training agreements, like Office of Program Management-Saudi Arabian National Guard (OPM-SANG) and US Military Training Mission (USMTM) in Saudi Arabia, allow for full-time training of GCC personnel. Periodic USAF deployments to work with individual GCC aviation units would allow for higher-tempo training in the tasks of

those units, alongside their US wartime coalition partners. Finally, deployments for combined exercises would allow for the development of tactical-level interoperability within the GCC.



**Figure 7 USAF F-15C Eagles in formation with an RSAF F-5E**

These lower-level efforts will be in vain if the GCC's ability to command and control airpower is not improved. AFDD-1 describes the central tenet of aerospace power as centralized control, decentralized execution. This has proven the best way to control aerospace power, and emphasizes the critical role of operational-level command and control in prosecuting air operations.<sup>3</sup> Fortunately, many of the same solutions can be applied to this problem. First of all, operational-level exercises with the GCC states should be scheduled at least annually. This has a training benefit for both sides, in that GCC personnel get exposure to higher-tempo operations, US personnel become more familiar with their allies, and both sides gain experience working in a coalition environment. High-level military-to-military contacts enhance this awareness, as well as allowing senior officers to better understand the policies and doctrines of their wartime

partners. All of these measures, at the tactical and operational level, increase the ability of both the US and the GCC to conduct all required missions in the region.

**Table 3 Proposed Engagement Objectives<sup>1</sup>**

<b>Military Objectives</b>	<b>Aerospace Power Objectives</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Maintain, support and contribute to coalitions and other collective security efforts that support U.S. and mutual interests in the region.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Develop interoperability at the tactical level among the GCC air forces</li> <li>• Develop interoperability at the operational level among the GCC air forces</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Promote and support responsible and capable regional militaries.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increase the proficiency of GCC aircrew and ground personnel to NATO standards.</li> <li>• Establish multinational use of aerial refueling and air surveillance capabilities—both of which are organic to the Royal Saudi Air Force.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establish and maintain close relationships with regional political and military leaders.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establish regular contacts between high-level airpower leaders in region and US aerospace power leaders</li> </ul>

**Table 4 Possible Engagement Force Packages**

<b>GCC Capabilities</b>	<b>GCC Platforms</b>	<b>Equivalent US Platforms</b>
All-Weather Precision Engagement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Saudi Arabia—F-15S</li> <li>• Kuwait—F/A-18</li> <li>• UAE—Mirage 2000</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• F-15E Strike Eagle</li> <li>• F-16CG</li> </ul>
Air Superiority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Saudi Arabia—F-15C</li> <li>• UAE/Qatar—Mirage 2000</li> <li>• Bahrain—F-16ADF</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• F-15C Eagle</li> <li>• F-16ADF (In ANG)</li> </ul>
Tactical Airlift	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Saudi Arabia—C-130</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• C-130</li> </ul>
Air Refueling	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Saudi Arabia—KE-3</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• KC-135</li> <li>• KC-10</li> </ul>
Air Surveillance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Saudi Arabia—E-3</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• E-3B</li> </ul>

<sup>1</sup> All military objectives are drawn verbatim from US Central Command Regional Strategy, available online at [http://www.centcom.mil/theater\\_strat/theater\\_strat.htm](http://www.centcom.mil/theater_strat/theater_strat.htm).

## **Counterproliferation Activities**

Joint MOOTW doctrine identifies counterproliferation as a central task of MOOTW. Activities described under this heading include arms control, the enforcement of sanctions and maritime intercept operations, and the enforcement of exclusion zones.<sup>4</sup> All of these are potentially applicable in the Iraq scenario, where the possession and manufacture of WMD will continue to be banned even after sanctions end. AFDD 2-3 adds greater detail to the aerospace power solution, detailing the same areas as JP 3-07.<sup>5</sup> Support to sanctions and exclusion enforcement will typically include intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) measures, as well as command and control support. Arms control support involves anything from providing ISR support to arms control measures, as well as airlift for any personnel or material requiring it.



**Figure 8 The U-2S reconnaissance aircraft**

The aerospace power solution advocated here is a supporting, as opposed to primary role. Space systems will provide continuous access to Iraq, and may provide our major source of reconnaissance data. Additionally, aerial surveillance of shipping lanes and border areas/crossing points will be required to ensure Iraq's compliance with UN restrictions. Finally,

Air Force assets may be called upon to pick up and transport WMD-related materials out of theater. While not the main effort, counterproliferation functions lead us into the next role—deterrent and punitive measures, where aerospace power again takes the lead role.

**Table 5 Proposed Counterproliferation Objectives**

Military Objectives	Aerospace Power Objectives
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Promote efforts in the region to counter threats from weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, information warfare, and drug trafficking.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Maintain overland and overwater surface surveillance capabilities</li> <li>Provide strategic and tactical airlift in support of counterproliferation activities</li> <li>Be prepared to conduct strikes/raids in support of counterproliferation activities</li> </ul>

### **Deterrent and Punitive Measures**

Both of the previous efforts will contribute both to deterrent and punitive measures. Engagement activities will provide the diplomatic and military access to the region, and counterproliferation activities may well lead to deterrent or punitive measures. Once again, both JP 3-07 and AFDD 2-3 provide for multiple types of military measures to address these contingencies. First of all, there are show the force operations, involving quickly establishing a forward presence where and when required. Secondly, Joint and Air Force doctrine allows for the conduct of strikes and raids within the MOOTW umbrella.<sup>6</sup> Accordingly, aerospace objectives in this area would include deterrence of Iraqi aggression, destruction of WMD material and manufacturing facilities, and degradation of the Hussein regime's ability to violate strictures against the possession of WMD and long-range ballistic missiles.



**Figure 9 An FDO Package--The 366<sup>th</sup> Wing in Formation over Egypt**

Military deterrent operations are integrally linked with diplomatic and informational measures. JP 3-07 clearly states the dominance of political objectives in these operations, emphasizing the need for close coordination with diplomatic efforts.<sup>7</sup> Show of force operations comprise the principal deterrent tool, allowing for the establishment of flexible deterrent options (FDO). Aerospace-oriented FDOs are especially flexible, capable of transitioning to strike or raid operations if required, or serving as a baseline for the development of further show-of-force operations. The structure of an aerospace power FDO should be established prior to deploying it into the region. A careful analysis of required capabilities beforehand could result in a range of different show of force options, descending from the scenario in question. These options could cover the range of events, from a threat of strikes against WMD infrastructure to deterrence of aggressive Iraqi military maneuvers.

**Table 6 Deterrent Objectives**

<b>Military Objectives</b>	<b>Aerospace Power Objectives</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Deter conflict through demonstrated resolve in such efforts as forward presence, prepositioning, exercises, and confidence building measures.</li> <li>• Maintain command readiness to fight and win decisively at all levels of conflict.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Develop and deploy FDOs in support of counterproliferation efforts</li> <li>• Develop and deploy FDOs in response to Iraqi military actions signaling hostile intent</li> </ul>

**Table 7 Possible Flexible Deterrent Option (FDO) Packages**

<b>Scenario</b>	<b>Aerospace Power Capabilities Required</b>	<b>USAF Platforms</b>
Counterproliferation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ISR</li> <li>• Air Superiority/SEAD</li> <li>• Precision Strike</li> <li>• Air Refueling</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• U-2S, E-3B</li> <li>• F-15C, F-16CJ, EA-6B</li> <li>• F-15E, F-16CG, F-117, B-2A</li> <li>• KC-10, KC-135</li> </ul>
UNSCR 949 Violation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ISR</li> <li>• Air Superiority/SEAD</li> <li>• Counterland (CAS/AI)</li> <li>• Area Denial</li> <li>• Precision Strike</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• E-8C JSTARS, E-3, U-2S</li> <li>• F-15C, F-16CJ, EA-6B</li> <li>• OA-10A, A-10A, F-16C</li> <li>• B-1B, B-52H</li> <li>• F-16CG, F-15E</li> </ul>
Ground Threat to Kuwait	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ISR</li> <li>• Air Superiority/SEAD</li> <li>• Counterland (CAS/AI)</li> <li>• Area Denial</li> <li>• Precision Strike</li> <li>• Tactical Airlift</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• E-8C JSTARS, E-3</li> <li>• F-15C, F-16CJ, EA-6B</li> <li>• OA-10A, A-10A, F-16C</li> <li>• B-1B, B-52H</li> <li>• F-16CG, F-15E</li> <li>• C-130</li> </ul>

Strikes and raids are offensive operations that comprise part of the MOOTW spectrum, and are usually in response to some aggressive action on the part of an adversary. In this case, there are a variety of possible scenarios for strikes against Iraq, even in a post-sanctions environment. These include responses to violations of UNSCR 687 restrictions on WMD, violations of UNSCR 949 restrictions against force deployments to the south, or actions that threaten the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. FDOs might precede actual strike operations, in an effort to force Saddam to back down prior to actually using force. Once again, the

capabilities required vary based on the scenario in question. FDOs represent one of the best capabilities aerospace power makes available to decision-makers. First of all, it provides a flexible and tailorable package that can address most contingencies. Secondly, it provides military power to the US, at lower political and military risk than the introduction of a large ground echelon. Finally, it once again matches up best with the capabilities and conditions found in theater.

**Table 8 Strike and Raid Objectives**

<b>Military Objectives</b>	<b>Aerospace Power Objectives</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Promote efforts in the region to counter threats from weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, information warfare, and drug trafficking.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Execute strike operations to destroy or degrade WMD production capability</li> <li>Execute strike operations to destroy or degrade ballistic missile production capabilities</li> <li>Execute strike/raid operations to seize or destroy material required for WMD or ballistic missile R&amp;D or production</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Protect, promote and preserve U.S. interests in the Central Region to include the free flow of energy resources, access to regional states, freedom of navigation, and maintenance of regional stability.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Conduct strike operations to prevent Iraq from violating UNSCR 949</li> <li>Conduct strike operations to deny Iraq ability to threaten Kuwait with local ground forces</li> </ul>

**Table 9 Possible Strike/Raid Force Packages**

<b>Scenario</b>	<b>Aerospace Power Capabilities Required</b>	<b>USAF Platforms</b>
Counterproliferation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>ISR</li> <li>Air Superiority/SEAD</li> <li>Precision Strike</li> <li>Air Refueling</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>U-2S, E-3B</li> <li>F-15C, F-16CJ, EA-6B</li> <li>F-15E, F-16CG, F-117, B-2A</li> <li>KC-10, KC-135</li> </ul>
UNSCR 949 Violation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>ISR</li> <li>Air Superiority/SEAD</li> <li>Counterland (CAS/AI)</li> <li>Area Denial</li> <li>Precision Strike</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>E-8C JSTARS, E-3, U-2S</li> <li>F-15C, F-16CJ, EA-6B</li> <li>OA-10A, A-10A, F-16C</li> <li>B-1B, B-52H</li> <li>F-16CG, F-15E</li> </ul>



Ground Threat to Kuwait	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ISR</li> <li>• Air Superiority/SEAD</li> <li>• Counterland (CAS/AI)</li> <li>• Area Denial</li> <li>• Precision Strike</li> <li>• Tactical Airlift</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• E-8C JSTARS, E-3</li> <li>• F-15C, F-16CJ, EA-6B</li> <li>• OA-10A, A-10A, F-16C</li> <li>• B-1B, B-52H</li> <li>• F-16CG, F-15E</li> <li>• C-130</li> </ul>
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### **If Deterrence Fails—Warfighting Operations**

If deterrence fails, or Iraq commits an unprovoked act of war similar to the original invasion of Kuwait in 1990, then all warfighting capabilities will be required. In one of the more difficult possible scenarios, Iraqi forces would launch a short notice, three to five division attack against Kuwait, in a scenario CENTCOM calls the Basrah Breakout. This attack would involve three regular Army divisions in the area north of Kuwait, with two Republican Guards divisions deploying rapidly in support of the attack.<sup>8</sup> The full range of conventional military options will be available to the Joint Force Commander in dealing with the crisis. However, land-based aerospace power remains the best tool for dealing with this crisis as well. The speed in which aerospace power can bring significant firepower to the fight mandates focusing on it in order to achieve a decisive halt, while allowing time for further deployment of friendly forces.<sup>9</sup>

In conducting this short-notice campaign against an Iraqi ground attack, a variety of capabilities must be brought to bear, as illustrated in Table 10. Organizing aerospace forces to conduct operations will be critical in this environment, as will leveraging both space and air mobility capabilities. An Air Expeditionary Task Force (AETF) will be established to provide forces and a command staff for the JFACC. Air Force forces underneath the JFACC will be organized in Air Expeditionary Wings (AEWs). These AEWs will include the platforms needed to provide the capability to execute the Joint Force Commander's scheme of maneuver.<sup>10</sup> The proper integration of space assets will be critical in support of a short-notice operation. Space force enhancement capabilities will provide necessary ISR, communications, missile launch

warning, weather information, and navigation support. Additionally, space superiority will be required. This will take the form of preventing the Iraqis from accessing commercially available space capabilities as well as ensuring our own access to space.<sup>11</sup> Air mobility will support all parts of the ongoing operation, from providing intertheater logistics support, transfer of material within theater, and providing aerial refuelling for all operations.<sup>12</sup> The latter merits special attention, as operating in this theater requires aerial refueling, or the ranges involved preclude the employment of aerospace power. Once the aerospace forces are made available and deploy, proper employment in the counterland role becomes essential.

**Table 10 Required Capabilities and Matching Aerospace Platforms**

<b>Aerospace Power Capabilities Required</b>	<b>Aerospace Platforms</b>
Air Superiority	F-15C
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses	F-16CJ, EA-6B, EC-130E Compass Call
Counterland (CAS/AI)	O/A-10A, F-16C
Precision Attack	F-15E, F-16CG, F-117, B-2A
Standoff Precision Attack	B-52/CALCM, F-15E/AGM-130
Area Denial	B-1B, B-52
ISR	E-3, E-8, U-2S, RC-135, Predator/other UAVs
Intratheater Airlift	C-130E/H/J
Command and Control	E-3, EC-130E ABCCC



**Figure 10 Bombers are the primary area denial systems**

In this scenario, a premium will be placed on air efforts against a ground force. AFDD 2-1.3, Counterland, describes how aerospace power can be used against a ground force. The emphasis in this area would be on the two traditional missions—air interdiction (AI) and close air support (CAS). The air interdiction efforts in this scenario would primarily focus on delaying the enemy force, and using that opportunity to create bottlenecks that canalize Iraqi ground forces, making their destruction easier. Theater ISR capabilities are essential for this effort, as well as mission-type orders from the JFC that allow the JFACC to act quickly in taking advantage of fleeting opportunities.<sup>13</sup> The CAS effort would focus on direct support of engaged ground forces, as always. It will have to be effectively integrated with artillery and rotary-winged air in order to mass firepower where the land component is most in need of it.<sup>14</sup> The integration of Kuwaiti with US forces, and possibly other GCC member state forces, further emphasizes the need for solid command and control. It is here that efforts directed toward engagement prior to a conflict will pay off. US and GCC forces will have gained increased experience in conducting combined operations, and be able to function as a practiced team.



**Figure 11 O/A-10A—the primary Air Force CAS platform**


The other critical tenet in this scenario is that the aerospace power can serve as a maneuver force, and is in fact ideally suited for it in this scenario. AFDD 2-1-3 describes the purpose of maneuver as “a combination of movement and fire...to achieve a position of advantage over the enemy.”<sup>15</sup> Since this effort often seeks to achieve shock effect or neutralization as opposed to outright destruction, aerospace power forces are tailor-made for the purpose.<sup>16</sup> The Iraqi transportation network in the south is very vulnerable. General Schwartzkopf noted prior to DESERT STORM that if the bridges over the Euphrates River were destroyed, it would then become a natural barrier to the Iraqis.<sup>17</sup> Surface barriers do not hinder aerospace power forces, though. Rapid exploitation of this weakness could trap deploying forces north of the Euphrates, removing them from the fight, and prevent resupply of forces already committed.



**Figure 12 F-15E Strike Eagle precision-attack platform**

Finally, the role of surface forces in this effort should not be discounted—but it is not the traditional one of serving as the decisive force. The US Army maintains a prepositioned brigade set of equipment in Kuwait. After personnel are brought in to man the brigade (by air), that unit

can then serve a supporting role for the main aerospace power effort. First of all, the presence of heavy forces (in addition to the Kuwaitis) fixes the Iraqis, forcing them to honor the threat posed by that brigade and making their targeting and destruction by air forces that much easier. Secondly, the long-range artillery provided, especially ATACMS if available, provides another tool in response to quickly developing scenarios. However, coordination efforts may be difficult. It is likely that this unit will act on a non-linear battlefield, taking advantage of its maneuver capabilities. As such, command and control measures beyond the traditional linear fire support coordination line (FSCL) are required. This could include the establishment of a box or circle around the unit (see figure 13).<sup>18</sup> If striking within the unit's area, normal coordination procedures would apply. If striking outside of it, the JFACC would have maximum flexibility to conduct operations.<sup>19</sup> This arrangement would shift the application of both air and ground power from a static and linear battlespace to a dynamic one, emphasizing the maneuverability of both the ground and air forces engaging the Iraqis.



**Figure 13 Illustration of non-traditional coordination measures**

In short, the advantages aerospace power confers on the combatant commander in this theater cannot be ignored. Should Iraq attempt an invasion of Kuwait at present, air forces will act in their traditional countermobility, close air support, and interdiction roles. However, the speed and flexibility inherent in aerospace power forces enable them to engage a full variety of

targets throughout the battlespace, as well as rapidly creating opportunities that can then be exploited in the manner of a maneuver force.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, 16 June 1995, p. III-9, and AFDD 2-3, MOOTW, 3 July 2000, p. 26, available online at <http://www.doctrine.af.mil>.

<sup>2</sup> Anthony Cordesman, The Gulf in Transition: US Policy Ten Years After the Gulf War, pp. 49-124, available online at <http://www.csis.org/gulf/reports/mainfullreport.PDF>.

<sup>3</sup> AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 1 Sep 1997, p. 23, available online at <http://www.doctrine.af.mil>.

<sup>4</sup> JP 3-07, p. III-1.

<sup>5</sup> AFDD 2-3, pp. 13 and 23.

<sup>6</sup> JP 3-07, pp. III-14 to III-15, and AFDD 2-3, pp. 14, 28.

<sup>7</sup> JP 3-07, p. III-15.

<sup>8</sup> Cordesman, Iraq and the War of Sanctions, p. 73.

<sup>9</sup> AFDD 1, pp. 42-43.

<sup>10</sup> AFDD 2, Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power, 17 February 2000, pp. 36-38, available online at <http://www.doctrine.af.mil>.

<sup>11</sup> AFDD 2-2, Space Operations, 23 August 1998, pp. 8-12, available online at <http://www.doctrine.af.mil>.

<sup>12</sup> AFDD 2-6, Air Mobility Operations, 25 June 1999, pp. 5-11, available online at <http://www.doctrine.af.mil>.

<sup>13</sup> AFDD 2-1.3, Counterland, 27 August 1999, pp. 23-29, available online at <http://www.doctrine.af.mil>.

<sup>14</sup> AFDD 2-1.3, pp. 36-38.

<sup>15</sup> AFDD 2-1.3, p. 7.

<sup>16</sup> AFDD 2-1.3, p. 7.

<sup>17</sup> Joint Pub 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, 13 April 1995, p. II-16.

<sup>18</sup> AFDD 2-1.3, p. 63.

<sup>19</sup> AFDD 2-1.3, pp. 62-63.

## **Chapter 6**

### **Conclusions**

When sanctions against Iraq are gone, our ability to hinder the resurgence of the Iraqi military threat will be severely limited when compared to the present. That the Hussein regime will take the opportunity to rebuild the Iraqi armed forces and regain a dominant position in the region is a foregone conclusion. The GCC states will not be inclined to support today's level of direct military engagement, as most of them view Iran to be a greater threat than Iraq under any terms. However, US vital interests in the region will remain the same. All of these factors will serve to constrain future action in the Persian Gulf, and dictate thinking about it in the present.

When the sanctions are lifted or end, the Hussein regime will begin to rebuild the forces that Iraq had prior to the invasion of Kuwait. Reconstruction of heavy armored forces would give Iraq the capability to overwhelm its neighbors, and the concurrent re-establishment of the air force and air defense network would protect them from attacks into their own homeland. The conventional forces would provide a shield for the reconstruction of WMD and ballistic missile programs, which gives the Hussein regime two advantages. First, they provide a strategic deterrent against Iraq's enemies. Second, should Iraq go to war against the GCC, WMD provides an asymmetric capability against them, as well as a means to hinder US access to the region. However, material, organizational, and training shortcomings will have to be addressed

in order for the Iraqi forces to return to their pre-DESERT STORM condition. Once they do, there is little doubt of defeating the GCC.

There is little the GCC could do on its own to hold against Iraq. Their ground forces are simply not up to the task of defeating those of Iraq at present and would be overwhelmed. However, they do possess superior air forces to Iraq, and this trend could continue in a post-sanctions environment. Having numerically and technologically superior air forces to Iraq is not all that is required. They are unable to act together in a Coalition, and many of the member countries do not have the capability to employ their air forces properly. It is the Iraqi lack of competence that makes the GCC air forces superior at present. This situation presents the first priority for the United States.

The US vital interests in the Persian Gulf involve ensuring the free flow of oil out of the Gulf, maintaining regional stability, and containing Iraqi threats to our allies. This establishes the foundation for both present and future strategy in the region. US Central Command, as the lead military agency for the theater, has established the military objectives for US regional engagement. These objectives dictate that the first priority is on maintaining ties with regional allies, and the second on the containment of Iraq. As always, preparation for war is a requirement should the other measures fail. These objectives provide the framework for the development of a regional military strategy. The primary weight of effort under that strategy will fall to land-based aerospace power. It is well suited to the region—there are few natural barriers to its employment, and there is an extensive infrastructure available to receive it. Additionally, it corresponds most directly with the strengths of our allies, and is best able to deploy quickly with the kind of power needed to counter the Iraqi threat.



The strategy for proper employment of aerospace power in the region must address four issues. First of all, engagement with the GCC is the highest priority. Increased training and exercise with the allied air forces will enhance their capabilities at both the tactical and operational level. Support activities for the continuing counterproliferation mission will be required, including ISR measures and providing lift support for other involved agencies. Flexible deterrent options involving tailored aerospace packages will provide specific capabilities and serve two purposes. First of all, they provide visible demonstrations of national will that will hopefully prevent hostilities from occurring. And should military action be required, these measures will put forces in place that can transition from a deterrent to a combat role in short order. Two types of combat missions may be required. First of all, punitive strikes may be called for. Forces deployed under an FDO can transition directly to these operations, allowing for the quick completion of strike or raid missions. However, the wartime mission could be more complicated. Should Iraqi ground forces attack, aerospace forces will be required to conduct a wide range of operations to stop a ground advance. This is not to say that aerospace power can do it all—ground forces are vital to support an air scheme of maneuver. Non-traditional coordination measures will be required to maximize the flexibility of both air and ground forces during these operations. The FSCL box, as opposed to a linear FSCL in front of ground forces, provides an excellent example of this. In short, the nation is well served by reliance on land-based aerospace power in the Persian Gulf region. In a post-sanctions environment, it should serve as the predominant tool in the Joint effort, and be employed in such a way as to maximize its effectiveness, and the effectiveness of the other forces around it.

## **Appendix A**

### **Iraq's "Allies"—France, Russia, and China**

While not entirely inimical to US interests, France, Russia, and China all gain from resisting US interests in the Persian Gulf. It may revolve around economic interests, general opposition to the US, or fears of US dominance in a region vital to future development for that particular state.

#### **France**

France is antagonistic to current US policy in the Gulf for a number of reasons. These include disagreements over the policy of “dual containment” of Iraq and Iran, the levying of sanctions against Iran, and US military actions in the region. It has embarked on a number of missions throughout the region in an effort to resurrect its once primary position in the Middle East, to include brokering compromises over Iraq in the Security Council and peace missions into the Levant.<sup>1</sup> Their opposition to the US regarding Iraq is rooted in disagreements immediately after the war—they did not agree with the maintenance of what they viewed as crushing sanctions.<sup>2</sup> One example of this is their opposition to the continuation of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) mission in the days following Operation DESERT FOX. Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine said “We think it's time to move on to a mechanism more geared to the risk of future danger, rather than the systematic examination of what has happened in the past. This accurate and continuous monitoring should allow us to reconsider the question

of lifting the embargo."<sup>3</sup> After the bombings in early February of 2001, Vedrine expressed outrage, noting that it had "no basis in international law."<sup>4</sup>

The lack of support in the Arab world made it easier for the French to oppose the use of force. However, French opposition was rooted in a desire to oppose the US "manipulation" of the Security Council and to establish a separate French/European position on these issues. Additionally, the Iraqis have an estimated debt of \$7.5 billion to the French,<sup>5</sup> and represent a lucrative market for future exports, especially military ones. As a result, the French will achieve much of what they desire with the ending of the sanctions regime, both politically and economically. We should expect French support on UNSCR 687-related issues, as they have supported the intent of disarming Iraq of WMD. However, we can expect considerable disagreement on the appropriate methods. And we should expect the French to be a major player in the re-arming of Iraq. They have supplied the Iraqis with major end items before, and should be expected to continue.

## **Russia**

Russian policy in the region suffers from a malady familiar to American policymakers—it has become as much a staple of domestic politics in the Duma as international politics executed by the Foreign Ministry.<sup>6</sup> Initial Russian policies after the fall of the Soviet Union were essentially anti-Iraq, pro-UN, and pro-GCC, essentially the same positions as the US. But by the spring of 1994, Yeltsin was moving policy towards Iraq, in response to internal criticisms. From that point, Russia pursued a policy of improving relations with Iraq. Yevgeniy Primakov, a long-time friend of Saddam Hussein, served as foreign minister and prime minister and President Yeltsin in the middle part of the decade. Policy was developing along the lines that: 1) Russia was still important in world affairs, 2) some effort must be made to allow the Iraqis to make

good on a \$7 billion debt, and 3) allowing Russian companies to secure contracts with Iraq. Saddam Hussein has been dangling contracts in front of them to encourage these efforts. But in the Putin presidency, there has been recognition of a dangerous paradox for Russia. On one hand, Iraqi wealth is required to help restore the Russian economy. On the other hand, Russia cannot afford to undermine the UN, as it is one of the few tools at their disposal for curbing US power.<sup>7</sup>

This dichotomy will serve to define the Russian actions in the post-sanctions environment. They will supply Iraq with advanced weaponry, as Iraq will only be able to obtain it from them in some cases, and will also be able to pay using hard currency. However, they will have to be cognizant of weakening the UN in dealings with Iraq. If they wish to curb US power without provoking a confrontation, they must be willing to cut their losses at some point regarding Iraq, and let Saddam Hussein sink or swim on his own.

## **China**

The Chinese interest in the region is primarily economic, driven by a combination of the energy challenges they face, and their view that the Gulf is a significant economic region as a result of the energy stocks available there.<sup>8</sup> While China does possess significant oil reserves, the development of these reserves has lagged behind their energy needs. Accordingly, they are importing quantities of oil from the Persian Gulf. Curiously, they do not import significant quantities of oil from Iraq. Additionally, they have seen this as a place where their oil industry can offset some of the import costs by building and developing the Persian Gulf petroleum infrastructure. They have had drilling and construction contracts in a number of regional states.<sup>9</sup> While their work in Iraq has been limited, politically they have had many of the same concerns as the Arab states in the region. They are concerned about the precedent set by the US and the

UN in the ongoing inspection efforts, and by the suffering of the Iraqi people as a result of sanctions. They have confined themselves to their role on the Security Council, though, and do not actively oppose efforts against Iraq. However, they are much more engaged with Iran, and do not want to upset what is Coalition interest against Iraq, as opposed to the almost purely US interest against Iran.<sup>10</sup>

The impact of China on the post-sanctions environment is probably the most interesting of Iraq's "allies." They do not have a direct interest in the perpetuation of Saddam Hussein's regime, or his desires for hegemony in the Persian Gulf. Additionally, they share our desire for stability in the region, especially as they become more economically engaged. However, should we start assuming the role of dominant power in the region to an even greater extent, they will attempt to exercise some curbs on that expansion so long as the region is of political and economic interest.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> Pia Christina Wood, "Chirac's 'New Arab Policy' and Middle East Challenges: the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Iraq, and Iran," The Middle East Journal, Vol 52, Number 4, Autumn 1998, pp. 563-565.

<sup>2</sup> Wood, pp. 571-576.

<sup>3</sup> Barton Gellman, "Iraq Inspections, Embargo in Danger at U.N. Council," The Washington Post, 22 December 1998, available online at <http://washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/iraq/stories/un122298.htm>.

<sup>4</sup> William Drozdiak, "Europeans Urge U.S. Ally to Address Growing Rift," The Washington Post, 23 Feb 2001, available online at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A43300-2001Feb22.html>.

<sup>5</sup> Wood, pp. 571-576.

<sup>6</sup> Robert O. Freedman, "Russian Policy toward the Middle East: The Yeltsin legacy and the Putin Challenge," The Middle East Journal, Vol 55, Number 1, Winter 2001, p. 58.

<sup>7</sup> Freedman, pp. 72-80.

<sup>8</sup> John Calabrese, "China and the Persian Gulf: Energy and Security," The Middle East Journal, Vol 52, Number 3, Summer 1998, pp. 353-354.

<sup>9</sup> Xiaojie Xu, "China and the Middle East: Cross-Investment in the Energy Sector," Middle East Policy, Vol VII, Number 3, June 2000, pp. 123-128.

<sup>10</sup> Calabrese, pp. 360-361.

## **Appendix B**

### **Iraqi Diplomatic Measures**

Iraq has had two diplomatic successes in their effort to defeat sanctions. First of all, he has been enjoying success with the efforts directed against the GCC. There are three components to this approach. First of all, he exploits the hardship of the Iraqi people in such a way as to generate “sanctions fatigue” in other Arab states.<sup>1</sup> Secondly, he plays on both the fears of Iran and the concern over Iraq’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Finally, he links all of this in with the continuing failure of the peace process, and perceptions of US bias in favor of Israel. This approach has been very effective at distancing the US from regional partners. In February of 1998, almost all Arab states opposed strikes against Iraq in spite of their lack of cooperation with UNSCOM.<sup>2</sup> He also realized that the previous inspection regime, UNSCOM, was a tool for dividing the Security Council against itself. By exploiting the differences between the Permanent Five members of the Security Council, he has been able to exercise influence over the inspection activities inside of Iraq. He has courted nations like France and Russia with both oil deals and promises of future economic concessions in this effort.<sup>3</sup> Both of these efforts will continue to have utility in the future.

After sanctions, these diplomatic tools may provide greater freedom of action for Iraq. The best method for denying US forces access to the region is through the use of diplomacy, and driving a wedge between the US and the GCC may serve to accomplish that. Additionally,

Saddam will have to blunt actions against him in the Security Council. Guaranteeing that at least one of the Permanent Five is willing to veto measures proposed against him is an easy way to block off that diplomatic channel. And by not using force against his neighbors, he can continue to portray himself as an ally of Arabs against the West.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> Isam al-Khafaji, "The Myth of Iraqi Exceptionalism," Middle East Policy, Vol VII, No. 4, October 2000, pp. 76-78.

<sup>2</sup> Stephen Zunes, "Confrontation With Iraq: The Bankruptcy of US Policy," Middle East Policy, Vol VI, No. 1, June 1998, pp. 95-97.

<sup>3</sup> Anthony Cordesman, Iraq and the War of Sanctions: Conventional threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction, Praeger: Westport, CT, 1999, pp. 17-18.

## **Appendix C**

### **Iran**

The recent changes in Iran may signal a sea change in relations with both the US and the GCC states. This is not to say that it will continue at the same pace. Many of the gains that have been recorded over the last few years are being stalled, as a result of more conservative elements exercising control over political processes in Iran. They have been able to silence much of the pro-reform opposition, especially the press.<sup>1</sup> Diplomatically, Iran has begun to reach back out into the world following the election of President Mohammed Khatami, and the GCC has reciprocated these efforts. As discussed above, Iranian rapprochement with both Saudi Arabia and Oman has yielded dividends, and contributed to the overall stability of the region. The lone remaining foreign policy concern is their conflict with the UAE over the islands in the southern Persian Gulf.<sup>2</sup> In short, the GCC is trying to defuse tensions with Iran through diplomacy, addressing a major military shortfall through other means.

Getting on board with the GCC is going to prove difficult in this case. First of all, one of the touchstones of the Islamic revolution in Iran was opposition to the US, and the hardcore members of the clerical leadership need reciprocal vilification to provide for their own legitimacy. And the US reciprocates, painting Iran as a major threat to stability in the region. And while US concerns over Iranian WMD and ballistic missile programs are not unfounded, the Iranians see a need rooted in valid security concern. Those concerns are easily identified when



Iraq's use of ballistic missiles and chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War is factored in.<sup>3</sup> This is not to say that we cannot consider changing our diplomatic status with Iran, especially in light of our recent overtures to the Stalinist regime in North Korea.<sup>4</sup> Any stabilization of US relations with Iran will allow Iran to serve as a regional balance to Iraq, and allow the US to focus on what is the primary threat to regional stability.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> Director of Central Intelligence, Statement to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 7 February 2001, available online at [http://www.odci.gov/cia/public\\_affairs/speeches/UNCLASWWT\\_02072001.html](http://www.odci.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/UNCLASWWT_02072001.html).

<sup>2</sup> Anthony Cordesman, The Gulf in Transition: US Policy Ten Years After the Gulf War, pp. 142-143, 158, available online at <http://www.csis.org/gulf/reports/mainfullreport.PDF>.

<sup>3</sup> James H. Noyes, "Fallacies, Smoke and Pipe Dreams: Forcing Change in Iran and Iraq," Middle East Policy, Vol. VII, No. 3, June 2000, pp. 30-31.

<sup>4</sup> David Wurmser, Ted Galen Carpenter, Edward Peck and Graham Fuller, "The peace Beyond the Peace: What Role for Iran and Iraq?," Middle East Policy, Vol. VII, No. 3, June 2000, p. 9.

## **Appendix D**

### **Relevant UN Security Council Resolutions**

#### **RESOLUTION 687 (1991)**

*Adopted by the Security Council at its 2981st meeting,  
on 3 April 1991  
The Security Council,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990, 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 662 (1990) of 9 August 1990, 664 (1990) of 18 August 1990, 665 (1990) of 25 August 1990, 666 (1990) of 13 September 1990, 667 (1990) of 16 September 1990, 669 (1990) of 24 September 1990, 670 (1990) of 25 September 1990, 674 (1990) of 29 October 1990, 677 (1990) of 28 November 1990, 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990 and 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991,

*Welcoming* the restoration to Kuwait of its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and the return of its legitimate Government,

*Affirming* the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Kuwait and Iraq, and noting the intention expressed by the Member States cooperating with Kuwait under paragraph 2 of resolution 678 (1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end as soon as possible consistent with paragraph 8 of resolution 686 (1991),

*Reaffirming* the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions in the light of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait,

*Taking* note of the letter sent by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq on 27 February 1991 and those sent pursuant to resolution 686 (1991),

*Noting* that Iraq and Kuwait, as independent sovereign States, signed at Baghdad on 4 October 1963 "Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters", thereby recognizing formally the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait and the allocation of islands, which were registered with the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations and in which Iraq recognized the independence and complete sovereignty of the State of Kuwait within its borders as specified and accepted in the letter of the Prime Minister of Iraq dated 21 July 1932, and as accepted by the Ruler of Kuwait in his letter dated 10 August 1932,

*Conscious* of the need for demarcation of the said boundary,

*Conscious* also of the statements by Iraq threatening to use weapons in violation of its obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and of its prior use of chemical weapons and affirming that grave consequences would follow any further use by Iraq of such weapons,

Recalling that Iraq has subscribed to the Declaration adopted by all States participating in the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States, held in Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989, establishing the objective of universal elimination of chemical and biological weapons,

*Recalling* also that Iraq has signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, of 10 April 1972,

*Noting* the importance of Iraq ratifying this Convention,

*Noting* moreover the importance of all States adhering to this Convention and encouraging its forthcoming Review Conference to reinforce the authority, efficiency and universal scope of the convention,

*Stressing* the importance of an early conclusion by the Conference on Disarmament of its work on a Convention on the Universal Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and of universal adherence thereto,

*Aware* of the use by Iraq of ballistic missiles in unprovoked attacks and therefore of the need to take specific measures in regard to such missiles located in Iraq,

*Concerned* by the reports in the hands of Member States that Iraq has attempted to acquire materials for a nuclear-weapons programme contrary to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968,

*Recalling* the objective of the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

*Conscious* of the threat that all weapons of mass destruction pose to peace and security in the area and of the need to work towards the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of such weapons,

*Conscious* also of the objective of achieving balanced and comprehensive control of armaments in the region,

*Conscious* further of the importance of achieving the objectives noted above using all available means, including a dialogue among the States of the region,

*Noting* that resolution 686 (1991) marked the lifting of the measures imposed by resolution 661 (1990) in so far as they applied to Kuwait,

*Noting* that despite the progress being made in fulfilling the obligations of resolution 686 (1991), many Kuwaiti and third country nationals are still not accounted for and property remains unreturned,

*Recalling* the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, opened for signature at New York on 18 December 1979, which categorizes all acts of taking hostages as manifestations of international terrorism,

*Deploring* threats made by Iraq during the recent conflict to make use of terrorism against targets outside Iraq and the taking of hostages by Iraq,

*Taking* note with grave concern of the reports of the Secretary-General of 20 March 1991 and 28 March 1991, and conscious of the necessity to meet urgently the humanitarian needs in Kuwait and Iraq,

*Bearing* in mind its objective of restoring international peace and security in the area as set out in recent resolutions of the Security Council,

*Conscious* of the need to take the following measures acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,

1. *Affirms* all thirteen resolutions noted above, except as expressly changed below to achieve the goals of this resolution, including a formal cease-fire;

**A**

2. *Demands* that Iraq and Kuwait respect the inviolability of the international boundary and the allocation of islands set out in the "Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters", signed by them in the exercise of their sovereignty at Baghdad on 4 October 1963 and registered with the United Nations and published by the United Nations in document 7063, United Nations, Treaty Series, 1964;
3. *Calls* upon the Secretary-General to lend his assistance to make arrangements with Iraq and Kuwait to demarcate the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait, drawing on appropriate material, including the map transmitted by Security Council document S/22412 and to report back to the Security Council within one month;
4. *Decides* to guarantee the inviolability of the above-mentioned international boundary and to take as appropriate all necessary measures to that end in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

**B**

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General, after consulting with Iraq and Kuwait, to submit within three days to the Security Council for its approval a plan for the immediate deployment of a United Nations observer unit to monitor the Khor Abdullah and a demilitarized zone, which is hereby established, extending ten kilometres into Iraq and five kilometres into Kuwait from the boundary referred to in the "Agreed Minutes Between the State of

Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters" of 4 October 1963; to deter violations of the boundary through its presence in and surveillance of the demilitarized zone; to observe any hostile or potentially hostile action mounted from the territory of one State to the other; and for the Secretary-General to report regularly to the Security Council on the operations of the unit, and immediately if there are serious violations of the zone or potential threats to peace;

6. *Notes* that as soon as the Secretary-General notifies the Security Council of the completion of the deployment of the United Nations observer unit, the conditions will be established for the Member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678 (1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end consistent with resolution 686 (1991);

## C

7. *Invites* Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and to ratify the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, of 10 April 1972;
8. *Decides* that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of:
  - a. All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities;
  - b. All ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related major parts, and repair and production facilities;
9. *Decides*, for the implementation of paragraph 8 above, the following:
  - a. Iraq shall submit to the Secretary-General, within fifteen days of the adoption of the present resolution, a declaration of the locations, amounts and types of all items specified in paragraph 8 and agree to urgent, on-site inspection as specified below;
  - b. The Secretary-General, in consultation with the appropriate Governments and, where appropriate, with the Director-General of the World Health Organization, within forty-five days of the passage of the present resolution, shall develop, and submit to the Council for approval, a plan calling for the completion of the following acts within forty-five days of such approval:
    - i. The forming of a Special Commission, which shall carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's biological, chemical and missile capabilities, based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission itself;
    - ii. The yielding by Iraq of possession to the Special Commission for destruction, removal or rendering harmless, taking into account the requirements of public safety, of all items specified under paragraph 8 (a) above, including items at the additional locations designated by the Special Commission under paragraph 9 (b) (i) above and the destruction by Iraq, under the supervision of the Special Commission, of all its missile

capabilities, including launchers, as specified under paragraph 8 (b) above;

iii. The provision by the Special Commission of the assistance and cooperation to the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency required in paragraphs 12 and 13 below;

10. *Decides* that Iraq shall unconditionally undertake not to use, develop, construct or acquire any of the items specified in paragraphs 8 and 9 above and requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Special Commission, to develop a plan for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with this paragraph, to be submitted to the Security Council for approval within one hundred and twenty days of the passage of this resolution;
11. *Invites* Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968;
12. *Decides* that Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material or any subsystems or components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities related to the above; to submit to the Secretary-General and the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency within fifteen days of the adoption of the present resolution a declaration of the locations, amounts, and types of all items specified above; to place all of its nuclear-weapons-usable materials under the exclusive control, for custody and removal, of the International Atomic Energy Agency, with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission as provided for in the plan of the Secretary-General discussed in paragraph 9 (b) above; to accept, in accordance with the arrangements provided for in paragraph 13 below, urgent on-site inspection and the destruction, removal or rendering harmless as appropriate of all items specified above; and to accept the plan discussed in paragraph 13 below for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of its compliance with these undertakings;
13. *Requests* the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, through the Secretary-General, with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission as provided for in the plan of the Secretary-General in paragraph 9 (b) above, to carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's nuclear capabilities based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission; to develop a plan for submission to the Security Council within forty-five days calling for the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless as appropriate of all items listed in paragraph 12 above; to carry out the plan within forty-five days following approval by the Security Council; and to develop a plan, taking into account the rights and obligations of Iraq under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968, for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with paragraph 12 above, including an inventory of all nuclear material in Iraq subject to the Agency's verification and inspections to confirm that Agency safeguards cover all relevant nuclear activities in Iraq, to be submitted to the Security Council for approval within one hundred and twenty days of the passage of the present resolution;
14. *Takes note* that the actions to be taken by Iraq in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the present resolution represent steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons;

## **D**

15. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the steps taken to facilitate the return of all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, including a list of any property that Kuwait claims has not been returned or which has not been returned intact;

## **E**

16. *Reaffirms* that Iraq, without prejudice to the debts and obligations of Iraq arising prior to 2 August 1990, which will be addressed through the normal mechanisms, is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait;
17. *Decides* that all Iraqi statements made since 2 August 1990 repudiating its foreign debt are null and void, and demands that Iraq adhere scrupulously to all of its obligations concerning servicing and repayment of its foreign debt;
18. *Decides* also to create a fund to pay compensation for claims that fall within paragraph 16 above and to establish a Commission that will administer the fund;
19. *Directs* the Secretary-General to develop and present to the Security Council for decision, no later than thirty days following the adoption of the present resolution, recommendations for the fund to meet the requirement for the payment of claims established in accordance with paragraph 18 above and for a programme to implement the decisions in paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 above, including: administration of the fund; mechanisms for determining the appropriate level of Iraq's contribution to the fund based on a percentage of the value of the exports of petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq not to exceed a figure to be suggested to the Council by the Secretary-General, taking into account the requirements of the people of Iraq, Iraq's payment capacity as assessed in conjunction with the international financial institutions taking into consideration external debt service, and the needs of the Iraqi economy; arrangements for ensuring that payments are made to the fund; the process by which funds will be allocated and claims paid; appropriate procedures for evaluating losses, listing claims and verifying their validity and resolving disputed claims in respect of Iraq's liability as specified in paragraph 16 above; and the composition of the Commission designated above;

## **F**

20. *Decides*, effective immediately, that the prohibitions against the sale or supply to Iraq of commodities or products, other than medicine and health supplies, and prohibitions against financial transactions related thereto contained in resolution 661 (1990) shall not apply to foodstuffs notified to the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait or, with the approval of that Committee, under the simplified and accelerated "no-objection" procedure, to materials and supplies for essential civilian needs as identified in the report of the Secretary-General dated 20 March 1991, and in any further findings of humanitarian need by the Committee;
21. *Decides* that the Security Council shall review the provisions of paragraph 20 above every sixty days in the light of the policies and practices of the Government of Iraq, including the implementation of all relevant resolutions of the Security Council, for the purpose of determining whether to reduce or lift the prohibitions referred to therein;

22. *Decides* that upon the approval by the Security Council of the programme called for in paragraph 19 above and upon Council agreement that Iraq has completed all actions contemplated in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 above, the prohibitions against the import of commodities and products originating in Iraq and the prohibitions against financial transactions related thereto contained in resolution 661 (1990) shall have no further force or effect;
23. *Decides* that, pending action by the Security Council under paragraph 22 above, the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) shall be empowered to approve, when required to assure adequate financial resources on the part of Iraq to carry out the activities under paragraph 20 above, exceptions to the prohibition against the import of commodities and products originating in Iraq;
24. *Decides* that, in accordance with resolution 661 (1990) and subsequent related resolutions and until a further decision is taken by the Security Council, all States shall continue to prevent the sale or supply, or the promotion or facilitation of such sale or supply, to Iraq by their nationals, or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of:
  - a. Arms and related materiel of all types, specifically including the sale or transfer through other means of all forms of conventional military equipment, including for paramilitary forces, and spare parts and components and their means of production, for such equipment;
  - b. Items specified and defined in paragraphs 8 and 12 above not otherwise covered above;
  - c. Technology under licensing or other transfer arrangements used in the production, utilization or stockpiling of items specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above;
  - d. Personnel or materials for training or technical support services relating to the design, development, manufacture, use, maintenance or support of items specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above;
25. *Calls* upon all States and international organizations to act strictly in accordance with paragraph 24 above, notwithstanding the existence of any contracts, agreements, licences or any other arrangements;
26. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in consultation with appropriate Governments, to develop within sixty days, for the approval of the Security Council, guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24 and 25 above and paragraph 27 below, and to make them available to all States and to establish a procedure for updating these guidelines periodically;
27. *Calls* upon all States to maintain such national controls and procedures and to take such other actions consistent with the guidelines to be established by the Security Council under paragraph 26 above as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the terms of paragraph 24 above, and calls upon international organizations to take all appropriate steps to assist in ensuring such full compliance;
28. *Agrees* to review its decisions in paragraphs 22, 23, 24 and 25 above, except for the items specified and defined in paragraphs 8 and 12 above, on a regular basis and in any case one hundred and twenty days following passage of the present resolution, taking into account Iraq's compliance with the resolution and general progress towards the control of armaments in the region;
29. *Decides* that all States, including Iraq, shall take the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Government of Iraq, or of any person or body in Iraq,



or of any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or body, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was affected by reason of the measures taken by the Security Council in resolution 661 (1990) and related resolutions;

## **G**

30. *Decides* that, in furtherance of its commitment to facilitate the repatriation of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals, Iraq shall extend all necessary cooperation to the International Committee of the Red Cross, providing lists of such persons, facilitating the access of the International Committee of the Red Cross to all such persons wherever located or detained and facilitating the search by the International Committee of the Red Cross for those Kuwaiti and third country nationals still unaccounted for;
31. *Invites* the International Committee of the Red Cross to keep the Secretary-General apprised as appropriate of all activities undertaken in connection with facilitating the repatriation or return of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals or their remains present in Iraq on or after 2 August 1990;

## **H**

32. *Requires* Iraq to inform the Security Council that it will not commit or support any act of international terrorism or allow any organization directed towards commission of such acts to operate within its territory and to condemn unequivocally and renounce all acts, methods and practices of terrorism;

## **I**

33. *Declares* that, upon official notification by Iraq to the Secretary-General and to the Security Council of its acceptance of the provisions above, a formal cease-fire is effective between Iraq and Kuwait and the Member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678 (1990);
34. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter and to take such further steps as may be required for the implementation of the present resolution and to secure peace and security in the area.

## **RESOLUTION 949 (1994)**

*Adopted by the Security Council at its 3438th meeting,  
on 15 October 1994*

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* all its previous relevant resolutions, and *reaffirming* resolutions 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990, 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991, 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 689 (1991) of 9 April 1991 and 833 (1993) of 27 May 1993, and in particular paragraph 2 of resolution 678 (1990),

*Recalling* that Iraq's acceptance of resolution 687 (1991) adopted pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations forms the basis of the cease-fire,

*Noting* past Iraqi threats and instances of actual use of force against its neighbours,

*Recognizing* that any hostile or provocative action directed against its neighbours by the Government of Iraq constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region,

*Welcoming* all diplomatic and other efforts to resolve the crisis,

*Determined* to prevent Iraq from resorting to threats and intimidation of its neighbours and the United Nations,

*Underlining* that it will consider Iraq fully responsible for the serious consequences of any failure to fulfil the demands in the present resolution,

*Noting* that Iraq has affirmed its readiness to resolve in a positive manner the issue of recognizing Kuwait's sovereignty and its borders as endorsed by resolution 833 (1993), but *underlining* that Iraq must unequivocally commit itself by full and formal constitutional procedures to respect Kuwait's sovereignty, territorial integrity and borders, as required by resolutions 687 (1991) and 833 (1993),

*Reaffirming* the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Kuwait and Iraq,

*Reaffirming* its statement of 8 October 1994 (S/1994/PRST/58),

*Taking note* of the letter from the Permanent Representative of Kuwait of 6 October 1994 (S/1994/1137), regarding the statement by the Revolution Command Council of Iraq of 6 October 1994,

*Taking note also* of the letter from the Permanent Representative of Iraq of 10 October 1994 (S/1994/1149), announcing that the Government of Iraq had decided to withdraw the troops recently deployed in the direction of the border with Kuwait,

*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Condemns* recent military deployments by Iraq in the direction of the border with Kuwait;
2. *Demands* that Iraq immediately complete the withdrawal of all military units recently deployed to southern Iraq to their original positions;
3. *Demands* that Iraq not again utilize its military or any other forces in a hostile or provocative manner to threaten either its neighbours or United Nations operations in Iraq;
4. *Demands* therefore that Iraq not redeploy to the south the units referred to in paragraph 2 above or take any other action to enhance its military capacity in southern Iraq;
5. *Demands* that Iraq cooperate fully with the United Nations Special Commission;
6. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

## **Appendix E**

### **US Central Command Regional Objectives**

#### **US CENTRAL COMMAND'S REGIONAL STRATEGY**

United States Central Command's theater strategy, "Shaping the Central Region for the 21st Century," is derived directly from the National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy and other national security guidance. This strategy recognizes that USCENTCOM must closely coordinate its programs with other U.S. and coalition government, non-governmental and international agencies to enhance synergy and efficiently achieve desired goals. The strategy balances and integrates USCENTCOM activities in the region with those of our coalition partners and friends. Forward presence versus force projection, and warfighting readiness versus peacetime engagement programs are examples of activities that must be properly balanced. The Central Region is both vital to our national interests and highly dynamic. Constant assessment of and adjustment to the strategy is vital to the attainment of our goals as new challenges and opportunities appear. To support our strategy, facilitate integration and to protect America's interests and those of our friends, USCENTCOM theater goals are grouped into three key areas: warfighting, engagement and development.

#### **WARFIGHTING**

1. Protect, promote and preserve U.S. interests in the Central Region to include the free flow of energy resources, access to regional states, freedom of navigation, and maintenance of regional stability.
2. Develop and maintain the forces and infrastructure needed to respond to the full spectrum of military operations.
3. Deter conflict through demonstrated resolve in such efforts as forward presence, prepositioning, exercises, and confidence building measures.
4. Maintain command readiness to fight and win decisively at all levels of conflict.
5. Protect the force by providing an appropriate level of security and safety.

#### **ENGAGEMENT**

1. Maintain, support and contribute to coalitions and other collective security efforts that support U.S. and mutual interests in the region.
2. Promote and support responsible and capable regional militaries.

3. Promote efforts in the region to counter threats from weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, information warfare, and drug trafficking.
4. Establish and maintain close relationships with regional political and military leaders.
5. Develop integrated regional engagement approaches through cooperation with counterparts in the interagency, other unified commands, and key non-governmental and private volunteer organizations.

## **DEVELOPMENT**

1. Promote and support environmental and humanitarian efforts and provide prompt response to humanitarian and environmental crises.
2. Educate key leaders and the American public on the mission of USCENTCOM, the importance of the Central Region and the contributions made by our friends in the region in supporting vital U.S. interests.
3. Develop a positive command climate that encourages innovation, develops tomorrow's leaders, provides for a high quality of life, promotes respect of others, and increases appreciation of regional cultures.
4. Participate in concept and doctrine development, assessment of desired operational capabilities and integration of validated capabilities.
5. Maintain regional awareness of security, political, social and economic trends.

## **US CENTRAL COMMAND SUB-REGIONAL STRATEGY**

### ***—Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula—***

This sub-region includes the countries of Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Some of our most enduring partnerships exist with the countries of the Arabian Peninsula. Our friends in the region have and continue to support our presence in the region. Their contributions to our engagement in the region have included access to bases and ports, logistical and equipment support, infrastructure improvements and cost sharing of ongoing operations.

Since 1990, we have made great progress in our ability to deter and, if needed, respond rapidly to aggression through improvements in our prepositioning programs, infrastructure improvements and force projection capabilities. Coalitions and collective security will continue to be central to our engagement on the Peninsula. We will continue to emphasize military cooperation and interoperability, strengthening our relationships with the area's leaders and enhancing our military infrastructure in the region. Deterring Iraqi aggression and acquisition of weapons of mass destruction will remain key elements to maintaining stability in the region.

## ***Glossary***

AFDD	Air Force Doctrine Document
AI	Air Interdiction
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
CAS	Close Air Support
FDO	Flexible Deterrent Option
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
JFACC	Joint Forces Air Component Commander
JP	Joint Pub
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
SEAD	Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

**LANTIRN.** Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting InfraRed for Night. The two-pod system used on the F-16CG and F-15E for night and bad weather navigation, target identification, and target designation for laser-guided bombs.

**OPM-SANG.** Office of Program Management-Saudi Arabian National Guard. The US military assistance office that works with the Saudi Arabian National Guard forces.

**USMTM.** United States Military Training Mission. The Department of Defense security assistance mission to the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Defense and Aviation establishment.

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## **Pictures**

Picture on page 3: Central Intelligence Agency, available online at <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iz.html>.

Pictures on pages 5, 7, and 9: Taken by the author.

Pictures on pages 20,25,27,29, 34, and 35: Air Combat Command Multimedia Gallery, available online at <http://www2.acc.af.mil/gallery/>.

Picture on page 33: Air Force Link, available online at [http://www.af.mil/photos/images/bombers\\_b1\\_0002.jpg](http://www.af.mil/photos/images/bombers_b1_0002.jpg).